
Valuing Covenants Not to Compete
in a Professional Practice
Author’s Note: The
second edition of The Medical Practice Valuation Guidebook, NOW AVAILABLE,
includes a detailed mathematical example and Author’s Insight and Analysis
section, as well as the spreadsheet for performing the computations.
Valuators are often confronted with the need to allocate the results of a business enterprise valuation to individual assets. The need may arise for tax or financial reporting purposes, or perhaps as a useful cross check or reality check to the results of an income or market approach. Another example is in a jurisdiction that does not recognize personal goodwill as an asset for distribution in divorce. One of the more common and difficult intangibles to value is the noncompetition agreement executed in connection with the sale of a professional practice. A covenant not to compete is, in part, the measure of the value of key management (workforce in place) included in the valuation. The value of the covenant is NOT in addition to the value of the business, but is rather part of it.
In order to value the
covenant, a valuation of the entire business must first be completed in the
customary fashion. Next, the valuator
must forecast the income lost to the business in the event the seller competes
by preparing an Alternate Valuation.
This requires measuring those profits attributable solely to the seller
or (alternatively stated) those that would be lost if the seller did compete,
in each year of the forecast. It should be noted that the period of time
for which the alternate forecast must be evaluated should also be consistent
with the length of the covenant. Next,
the valuator must estimate the probability of competition in each year of the forecast
and apply that probability to the lost profits attributable to the seller. The present value is then computed, and the
result summed to determine the value of the covenant in the event of
competition.
1. Complete Valuation of Business
2. Estimate Probability of Competition in Each year
of Forecast
3. Prepare Alternate Valuation Assuming Seller
Competes, Estimate Profits Attributable to Seller
4. Compute Present Value
5. Present Value of Probability-adjusted Difference is Value of Covenant
The typical practice
valuation engagement may not generate all of the information desirable in
assessing the probability of competition.
Certain information may not be relevant to the actual transaction or may
involve data the seller is unwilling to supply for perfectly valid
reasons. On the other hand, there are
some cases where the likelihood of competition may be quite readily
apparent. Valuators should be certain
to be familiar with applicable state law as to the enforceability of
noncompetes, or nonsolicitation
agreements. A nonsolicitation agreement
would bar the seller from soliciting the services of the entity’s employees for
a new enterprise, for example, or soliciting former patients or clients. Other analogous provisions typical of
purchase and sale agreements include prohibitions against 1) defamatory
statements, 2) disclosure of trade secrets, and 3) use of “intellectual
property” of the practice.
Another area of inquiry
into the law that may be relevant in some circumstances, particularly
litigation, is the fiduciary duty owed a corporate entity by a
shareholder-officer, or that owed a partner to a partnership, or LLC member to
the LLC. For example, in some states a
shareholder may be barred from attempting to usurp for him- or herself
corporate opportunities. This could
extend to patients, employees, and other valuable intangible corporate
assets. In medical practices, there may
be a strong counter-weight to such prohibitions, however due to the requirement
for continuity of medical care, and the patient’s ownership of the information
contained in the medical record. The
threat of litigation may be a significant factor for the valuator to consider
when assigning a probability to competition.
The factors enumerated below are probably not exhaustive of the universe of potential relevant considerations. The order of assessment is relevant however, and the factors are detailed in the sequence recommended. Once a factor has made the probability of competition zero, consideration of other factors is (of course) unnecessary.
This is commonly cited
as the first and foremost factor in measuring probability. A 65-year-old physician selling his practice
is unlikely to start up a new practice, even if in good health. If the seller is in poor health, the
probability may decline to near zero.
If a seller intends to
re-locate beyond the area serviced by the existing practice, the probability of
competition may be near zero. If the
seller has already moved, is advertising the current residence for sale, or has
already purchased a new residence, the probability of competition is likely to
be so low as to be nonexistent or irrelevant.
It is not uncommon for
physicians to have business interests outside their practices, whether related
to medicine or not. The valuator may
wish to casually inquire as to the plans of the seller in this respect, and
pursue any relevant response.
It is conceivable one
might encounter a situation involving a physician who has started and sold
several practices in a given geographic area which would cause the valuator to
assess the probability of competition at a higher level.
This factor could be
listed earlier, but valuator’s are generally not qualified to make legal
determinations and therefore should look to other factors first. Due to the threat and cost of litigation, a
buyer’s counsel will often insist on a covenant, even if it is likely to be
unenforceable.
It is conceivable that a
selling practice may already have in place a noncompetition agreement between
its owners and the entity. A smart
buyer will likely look to acquire these agreements. The presence of such agreements can influence the determination
of who “owns” the intangible assets of the practice and in some jurisdictions
may influence the enforceability of a noncompete.
It would be unusual for
a sale of a small medical practice to generate sufficient assets for
retirement. However, the valuator may
become aware of other retirement assets through the review of historical data,
the contributions to pension or profit-sharing plans, or annual retirement plan
filings.
Aside from the sales
proceeds and retirement plan assets, other information about the seller’s
overall net worth may be very difficult to obtain, but the valuator should be
certain to look for evidence of same.
The assessment of the
probability of a seller competing is the most critical and difficult task
confronting the valuator. There is no
“rule of thumb” that can be employed, rather the valuator must carefully
consider the particulars of the situation.
After assessing the
factors listed above and any others the valuator finds relevant, a Table such
as that shown below is prepared summarizing the likelihood of competition in
each year covered by the covenant.
Probability of Competition Table-From Year of Transaction
|
Actual |
|
Effective |
|
Probability |
1-Probability |
Probability |
|
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
|
60.00% |
40.00% |
30.00% |
|
50.00% |
50.00% |
10.00% |
The valuator determines the
Actual probability for each year; the Effective
probability in year 2 and 3 must account for the probability in year 1 in
“decision tree” fashion. For example,
the probability in year 3 must be multiplied by the probability of no
competition in year 1 (100%-50%=50%) and year 2 (100%-60%=40%). The calculations of Effective probability
are shown below:
Year 2 - 60% *50%=30%
Year 3 - 50%*40%*50%=10%
In a small medical
practice, it is safe to assume that a substantial portion of the revenues and
profits are attributable to the seller.
In such a case, if the seller opened a competing practice the day after
the sale, the buyer would likely obtain little of what was bargained for, aside
from hard assets and the practice location.
As a practical matter, however, in the absence of misrepresentation, the
seller is unlikely to compete the very next day. Even if the seller decided the day after the sale to open a
competing practice, a site would have to be identified and acquired, equipment
and furnishings would have to be purchased, a billing system acquired and made
operational, old employees rehired or new ones hired and a host of other tasks
accomplished. (Author’s Note: See a detailed discussion of this process at http://www.cpa.net/Enterprise.html
).
As a practical matter,
some amount of time is likely to transpire between the sale and the
commencement of competition. The longer
this period of time, the greater the probability that the buyer will retain
some of the practice (or the profits attributable to the seller) that has been
purchased. In addition, the buyer is
unlikely to sit idly by if the seller opens a competing practice and will take
actions to attempt to preserve the investment that has been made. The valuator therefore needs to consider
both the elapsed time before
competition commences as well as the buyer’s
response, when attributing profits to the seller in the forecast period of
the Alternate Valuation.
Example
In the following
example, the valuator has attributed 75% of all profits to the seller as of the
valuation date. The valuator also
concludes that the risk of loss of profits to the seller’s competition would
decline from that 75% over time, and establishes 75% of the total profits
attributable to the seller as the baseline loss in year 1. In addition, the buyer’s response actions
would take several years to recapture the remaining lost profits. For example, in the first year, the 75% of
the profits attributable to the seller are deemed to be lost (75% of 75%). In the second year the buyer is estimated to
recover 25% of that 75%, leaving 56.25% unrecovered. Finally, in the third year, 50% of the 75% is recovered, leaving
37.50% unrecovered. To keep the example
relatively simple, we assume that the
effect of the seller’s competing is limited to a three-year period, regardless
of whether the seller commences competing in year 1, 2 or 3, and that the
profits lost will not vary with the year competition commences. (As a practical matter, the profits actually
lost would be less the longer the seller waited to compete.)
Lost Profits Table in the Year Competition Begins
|
Year |
%
Lost |
%
Recovered |
Net
Lost |
|
1 |
75.00% |
0.00% |
75.00% |
|
2 |
75.00% |
25.00% |
56.25% |
|
3 |
75.00% |
50.00% |
37.50% |
|
4 |
75.00% |
100.00% |
0.00% |
|
5 |
75.00% |
100.00% |
0.00% |
The following Chart
contains the Base or original valuation along with the Alternate
Valuation. Note that as of the
valuation date, 75% of that year’s profits are attributable to the seller.
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
Terminal |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Base Valuation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Free Cashflow |
30,600 |
51,504 |
42,125 |
47,134 |
49,229 |
48,670 |
355,534 |
|
Present Value (PV) |
317,326 |
47,034 |
32,852 |
31,390 |
27,998 |
23,638 |
154,413 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Alternate Valuation |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
% Profits Attributed To Seller |
|
75.00% |
75.00% |
75.00% |
75.00% |
75.00% |
75.00% |
|
PV Profits Attributed To Seller |
237,994 |
35,276 |
24,639 |
23,543 |
20,998 |
17,728 |
115,810 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Probability Of Competing |
|
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
|
Present Value |
118,997 |
17,638 |
12,319 |
11,771 |
10,499 |
8,864 |
57,905 |
The present value of the
Alternate Valuation is NOT the value
of covenant. It is simply an interim
step in computing the covenant’s value, which computes the value of the
business, or practice attributed to the seller assuming the seller is present
in the business ($237,994) and the value attributed to the seller ($118,997) ignoring the multiplicative effect of
probability. The presentation also
indicates two common errors in use of this method: Failure to account for the
buyer’s response to the seller’s competing, and failure to adjust years after
year 1 for the multiplicative effect
of probability.
The next Chart starts
with the present value of all profits attributed to the seller as of the
valuation date ($35,276) and in year 1, multiplies that by the 75% that are
estimated to be actually lost (taken from the Lost Profits Table above). The same
pattern is followed for years 2 and 3.
Note that this measures only the lost profits if the seller competes
commencing in year 1. The seller is
then assumed to continue to compete through the remainder of the three-year
term of the covenant.
The second half of the Chart
computes the value of the lost profits if
the seller commences competition in year 2.
No lost profits are included from year 1 since the seller did not
compete in that year.
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
Terminal |
||
|
Year 1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PV Net Profits |
|
35,276 |
24,639 |
23,543 |
20,998 |
17,728 |
115,810 |
|
|
|
Net % Attributed To
Seller |
|
75.00% |
56.25% |
37.50% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
|
Net $Profit Attributed To Seller |
|
26,457 |
13,859 |
8,829 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
Probability Of
Competing |
|
50.00% |
50.00% |
50.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
|
|
PV Of Lost Profits |
24,572 |
13,228 |
6,930 |
4,414 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Year 2 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PV Net Profits |
|
|
24,639 |
23,543 |
20,998 |
17,728 |
115,810 |
|
|
|
Net % Attributed To
Seller |
|
|
75.00% |
56.25% |
37.50% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
|
Net $Profit Attributed To Seller |
|
|
18,479 |
13,243 |
7,874 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
|
Probability Of
Competing |
|
|
30.00% |
30.00% |
30.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
|
|
PV Of Lost Profits |
11,879 |
|
5,544 |
3,973 |
2,362 |
0 |
0 |
|
|
The final Chart computes
the value of the lost profits if the seller commences competition in
year 3, and than totals the probability-adjusted present values for each year of
the three-year covenant (24,572+11,879+3,612=40,063).
|
|
|
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
|
Year 3 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PV Net Profits |
|
|
|
23,543 |
20,998 |
17,728 |
|
% Profits
Attributed To Seller |
|
|
|
75.00% |
56.25% |
37.50% |
|
Net $Profit Attributed To Seller |
|
|
|
17,657 |
11,812 |
6,648 |
|
Probability Of
Competing |
|
|
|
10.00% |
10.00% |
10.00% |
|
Pv Of Lost Profits |
3,612 |
|
|
1,766 |
1,181 |
665 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total Value Of Covenant |
40,063 |
|
|
|
|
|
Recap
It is not possible to
value a covenant without knowing the underlying value of the business, unless the
valuator has some other source for estimating the profits of the business
attributable to the seller. It should
also be noted that the value of the business represents an absolute ceiling on the value of the covenant, and therefore should
be determined in order to avoid overstating the covenant’s value.
Estimate the probability that the seller will compete in each year of the forecast covered by a noncompete
The most common source
of errors in valuing covenants is to ignore the impact of probability. It is rare for there to be a 100% likelihood
that the seller will compete, and almost equally as rare for 100% of the
profits in a business to be attributable to the seller. If all of the profits in a business were
attributable solely to the seller, it follows that all of the intangible value
is in the nature of personal goodwill, and none is business “goodwill” or
intangible value. A business consisting
solely of personal goodwill would much more difficult to transfer and warrant a
higher discount rate and a lower value, all other things being equal.
Complete an Alternate Valuation of the business assuming the seller competes and probability adjust each year’s cashflows
A valuation of the entire
business establishes one ceiling on the potential value of the covenant. The Alternate value establishes a second
ceiling since it is designed to identify all of the profits attributable to the
seller, if the seller were to remain in the business, without considering the
responses of the buyer to retain the business if the seller were to decide to
compete. A second step in the Alternate
value is probability weighting the profits attributable to the seller, without
considering the multiplicative effect of probability from year to year.
After the above steps
have been completed, the net profits expected to be lost to the seller’s
competition must be determined, considering (again) the responses of the
buyer. This requires the Alternate
value profits attributable to the seller to be multiplied by the percentage
representing the actual profits expected to be lost. Finally, the probabilities for each year, including the
multiplicative effect described earlier, are applied to the actual profits
expected to be lost and the present values summed.
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